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Abstract
Cross-cultural competence (3C) is essential for today’s Warfighters.  In response to this need, the Department of Defense (DoD)
has increasingly prioritized research focused on characterizing the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and abilities (KSAAs) underlying 
operational 3C and developing 3C assessment and training tools to enhance 3C in Warfighters.  This DoD-sponsored research has 
primarily focused on individual characteristics and capabilities (e.g., personality traits like agreeableness, biographical traits like 
gender, and 3C KSAAs like perspective taking and cognitive complexity) as predictors of mission effectiveness.  To date, 
research aimed at understanding how situational variables (e.g., time pressure or perceived threat to personal safety) impact 3C is 
scarce. This paper describes how the 3C tendencies and abilities displayed by a Warfighter can dramatically change under 
varying circumstances, proposes a method for identifying how specific situational factors impact specific 3C KSAAs, and 
discusses assessment and training implications.
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1. Introduction
Prior to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, many military theorists suggested that the United States'
technological superiority had fundamentally changed the nature of warfare [1].  Network-centric warfare and 
precision air strikes would "shock and awe" enemy forces into a quick surrender, minimizing the number of ground 
troops required for mission success [2].  Unfortunately, this strategy was fundamentally flawed; rather than 
surrendering, enemy forces retreated, regrouped, and developed new ways to fight [2].  By blending into the civilian 
population, insurgents neutralized the technological superiority of the United States and forced ground troops into a 
situation in which winning the support of the local populace was just as critical to mission success as finding and 
eliminating the enemy [3].  
Fortunately, the United States had leaders who were able to adapt. In Afghanistan’s Nawa district in June 2009, 
American forces could not travel a kilometer beyond the base perimeter without encountering Taliban machine gun
and rocket fire [3].  In July of that same year, American Marines began conducting foot patrols, interacting with 
citizens, and subsequently gaining the trust of the local populace [3].  The Marines quickly discovered that local 
elders resented the Taliban’s threat to their authority and began several initiatives that helped the elders solidify their 
power [3].  Once this new strategy was implemented, improvised explosive device (IED) incidents in the Nawa 
district dropped by 90% within the next five months, despite few kinetic actions taken by American forces. The 
Nawa district case demonstrates how understanding the strategic importance of cultural knowledge can support
mission success [3]. The ability to successfully understand and leverage cultural knowledge in novel cross-cultural 
environments is essential for today’s Warfighters and it extends beyond combat zones.  Whether negotiating with
village elders in Afghanistan, providing humanitarian aid in Haiti, or conducting joint training operations in the 
Philippines, Warfighters must be able to operate effectively in cultural environments different than their own.  This
ability to adapt effectively in cross-cultural environment has been labeled cross-cultural competence (3C) [4].
As the importance of 3C to mission success became more evident, the United States Department of Defense
(DoD) funded researchers and technologists from government, industry, and university laboratories to model the 
knowledge skills, attitudes, and abilities (KSAAs) that compose 3C [5].  For example, Abbe, Gulick, and Herman [4] 
proposed an early influential model of 3C detailing how various 3C KSAAs such as intercultural perspective taking 
(IPT) and cognitive complexity can promote mission success in cross-cultural operating environments.  This 
framework described how both individual characteristics and situational factors can impact an individual’s 3C as 
well as mission effectiveness. Their review suggested that the majority of 3C research had focused on how 
individual characteristics such as dispositional traits (e.g., Big Five personality traits like agreeableness), 
biographical traits (gender, race), self and identify factors (bicultural identity), and 3C KSAAs impact mission
effectiveness.  In contrast, little research had focused on how situational and organizational factors (such as time 
pressure or perceived threat to personal safety) impact mission effectiveness [4].  A more recent report [6] reached a 
similar conclusion, stating that to date, little research has specifically examined how situational factors impact the 
need for 3C competencies or identified the specific 3C competencies that would be required for certain missions.
This focus on individual characteristics is not surprising. Historically, the primary focus of psychological research 
has been on understanding and modeling what is inside a person’s head and using these individual characteristics to 
attempt to predict performance across a wide range of situations. As a result, researchers not only lack adequate 
descriptions of the environment, but also fail to recognize the need for such a description despite the overwhelming 
evidence that context matters [7]. Ecological Psychology, which seeks to explain human behavior in the context of 
the environment in which it is occurring, has attempted to address this deficit.  The roots of ecological psychology 
lie in the links between the social psychologist Roger Barker, perception psychologist J.J. Gibson, and the Radical 
Empiricist position of William James who all argue that psychological processes can only be fully understood in 
terms of pragmatic adaptations to ‘situations.’ [7]. For example, Barker’s research suggested that one could more 
accurately predict a child’s behavior from knowledge of the situation the child was in (e.g., in class, at a sporting 
event, etc.) than from the knowledge of the behavioral tendencies of a particular child (e.g., shy, outgoing, etc.) [8]. 
Zimbardo’s famous prison study [9], originally designed to showcase how prison guards’ inherent traits caused them 
to mistreat inmates, instead illustrated that behavior can be significantly impacted by situational factors. Participants 
who were randomly assigned to the prison guard condition mistreated the participants who were randomly assigned 
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to the inmate condition so badly that Zimbardo was forced to end the experiment early.  Despite all this evidence
suggesting that behavior can best be understood and predicted in the context of the situation in which it occurs (see 
Heft [7] for a thorough review), research continues to focus on characteristics of the individual.   
The goal of this paper is to explain the need for an ecological approach to 3C. First, it provides evidence that 
individual behavior within a cross-cultural mission environment can be significantly impacted by situational factors.  
Next, it describes a method for systematically investigating how specific situational factors impact 3C and mission 
effectiveness.  The paper then concludes with a discussion of how failing to understand how situational factors 
impact 3C can negatively impact 3C assessment and training efforts.
2. Situational factors matter
In two previous research efforts [10, 11], 74 interviews were conducted with Soldiers who had recently returned 
from deployments that required a high level of cross-cultural interaction.  Interviewers utilized the Critical Decision 
Method (CDM) to identify challenging cross-cultural incidents participants had experienced while deployed.  Using 
a specific incident as its starting point CDM employs a semi-structured interview format to elicit specific types of 
information from the interviewee [10].  In this case, interviewers focused on identifying the 3C KSAAs that seemed 
to promote mission effectiveness.  While analyzing the results of these interviews, it became clear that the 3C 
KSAAs displayed by the same Warfighter could change dramatically under varying circumstances.  
Consider, for example, an incident in which a Soldier described how his unit encountered an Iraqi man and his 
son digging in a field after midnight.  It is important to note that individuals planting IEDs often dig late at night, 
making this man’s behavior potentially suspicious.  Here is how the Soldier describes it: 
“We came up on him, of course, we scared him. ... I mean when you have eight Soldiers and everyone is pointing 
their weapons at the guy’s face…So, obviously…if you think about it, why not work at midnight when it’s maybe 85 
degrees rather than working in the middle of the day when it’s like 120 degrees. So, a lot of times, that’s what they 
would do. Sometimes they had second jobs. They’d be in the city during the day and do the day job. Then they’d 
come home and still have to work the fields at night.”
In spite of the man’s potentially suspicious behavior, the Soldier’s unit surmised that the man was probably a
farmer who was working late to avoid working in the hot sun. The Soldier was not only able to envision how the 
farmer may have felt but also had insight into the farmer’s thought process. This ability to understand how a person
from a different culture may think or feel has been labeled intercultural perspective taking (IPT) [11].  In this 
situation, the Soldier not only imagined how it would feel to be surrounded by a group of armed Soldiers in the 
middle of the night, but was also able to withhold judgment and consider alternative explanations for the man’s 
initially suspicious behavior.  Being able to recognize the difference between insurgent activity and a local villager
trying to make a living is vital for identifying appropriate actions to take in this operational setting.
This same Soldier later described another incident in which his unit stopped to address a malfunctioning vehicle 
and two Iraqi Soldiers who came across the patrol fired several shots at the Soldier’s unit. It is important to note that
several Sons of Iraq (a militia group funded and trained by the United States during Operation Iraqi Freedom) had 
been recently killed in an IED attack, resulting in a renewed presence of Iraqi Soldiers in the area. When questioned
about why they had fired on American forces, the Iraqi Soldiers claimed that they had thought the American forces 
were insurgents setting up an ambush.  At the time of the incident however, the Soldier clearly did not believe the 
Iraqi Soldiers’ explanation:
“I did not for one instance (sic) think that they thought they were shooting at someone else. The whole time they
should have known who we were. The vehicles, they’re noisy, it’s not like we’re riding stealth. They should have 
known. And we had been in all those areas and all that stuff. You know, they should have known.”
Furthermore, the Soldier’s initial reaction at the time of the incident did not seem to demonstrate high levels of 
3C:
“It was a total of four shots, so it wasn’t like they were constantly shooting at us... the minute they shot them 
bullets, everything changes, everything slows down…at least for me. So, everything slowed down, so when I got out 
of the truck, I was just thinking how bad I wanted to punch this guy. Just literally beat him to a pulp”
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His behavior in these two incidents presents a mixed picture regarding this Soldier’s 3C. When his unit had 
surrounded an unarmed Iraqi farmer and his son, this Soldier demonstrated a tendency to engage in IPT and 
displayed high levels of IPT. Yet, when threatened by friendly fire from Iraqi Soldiers, the same Soldier adamantly 
refused to consider the motives behind the Iraqi Soldiers’ actions even though, with the advantage of hindsight, the 
Soldier admitted that the Iraqi Soldiers were probably half asleep and jumpy due to recent IED incident and likely 
thought at the time that the American vehicles were insurgents.  The same Soldier displayed, under different 
circumstances, no IPT tendency and high levels of IPT ability, highlighting the importance of situational factors in 
influencing IPT frequency and quality.  In this case the perceived threat to Soldier’s safety significantly altered his 
tendency and ability to engage in IPT.
3. Investigating situational factors
Despite the impact of situational factors on 3C, the authors are aware of only a single study that has examined 
how situational factors impact the need for cross-cultural competencies [6]. Based on archival data as well as 
interviews with Soldiers, this study proposed a framework of 62 situational factors that were organized into the 
following seven clusters [6]: 
x Indicators of Threat (e.g., a Soldier perceived a threat to his or her personal safety)
x Drivers of Effective Partnerships (e.g., a Soldier lacked trust in the individual with whom he or she was 
interacting) 
x People (e.g., the individual the Soldier was interacting with was of a different gender, race, or power level)
x Societal Factors and Beliefs (e.g., the attitude of the society the Soldier was interacting with towards the United 
States)
x Time (e.g., the Soldier was operating under time pressure)
x Interaction Location (e.g., the Soldier’s interaction occurred in a secured United States controlled facility instead 
of a remote village in contested territory)
x Mission Types (e.g., the Soldier was training foreign forces, performing combat operations, or providing
humanitarian aid)
While this framework is an important first step, additional research is needed to examine how these situational 
factors impact specific 3C competencies, and how they may interact. While this research would ideally involve 
manipulating situational variables to explore their impact on cross-cultural effectiveness, these types of experimental 
methods cannot be employed in operational situations, so alternative methods need to be devised. The simulation 
interview is a promising method to approach the study of situational factors in operational settings [12].  One version 
of simulation interview involves a participant providing verbal responses to a realistic military scenario that requires
3C (often based on incidents collected during CDM interviews).  For example, in a recent study 70 participants 
completed a simulation interview set in the central African country of Burundi [12].  The simulation interview used 
in that study had six major sections:    
x Mission Preparation. Participants were informed that they would be leading a small force tasked with conducting 
counter-insurgency and stability support operations in the central African country of Burundi.  Participants were 
asked how they would assess their team’s deployment readiness as well as how they would prepare for the
mission.
x Meeting the Interpreter and Local Leaders. Participants were introduced to their new interpreter and informed 
that a surprise initial meeting with local government leaders would be taking place in less than two hours.  
Participants were asked how they would interact with their interpreter and how they would prepare for this 
meeting.
x Village Visit.  Participants were informed that their team would be making a visit to a village that has had 
previous negative experiences with American forces.  Participants were asked how they would prepare for this 
visit as well as what their plans would be once they reached the village.
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x Conflict with Village Elder. Participants were informed that the initial village visit went well and that they
established a fragile, yet friendly relationship with the village elder. However, participants were also told that 
they had received word that an insurgent was hiding in the village, but that the elder disputed this claim.  
Participants were asked how they would interact with the village elder and whether or not they would raid the 
house the insurgent was suspected to be hiding in.
x Raid Aftermath. Participants were informed that they would be raiding the house.  Participants were asked how 
they would handle the aftermath of the raid as well as how they would work with the village elder moving 
forward.  
x Training the Locals.  Participants were informed that they must work with local leaders to establish a security 
forces program.  Participants were asked how they would plan the training and also handle a situation in which 
the trainees do not show up at the appointed time.
While CDM interviews elicit how a single Soldier responds to a specific real-world situation, the simulation 
interview provides the opportunity to expose a large number of participants to the same scenario. By making 
changes to the situational factors within the scenario, researchers can examine how a specific situational factor 
impacts a 3C KSAA like IPT.  For example, two versions of the above simulation interview were administered to 
two groups of participants. In both groups, participants received intelligence from a trusted source that a high-
ranking insurgent was hiding in the village.  The village elder, with whom the participant had built a working 
relationship, informed the participant that their intelligence was wrong and that the insurgent was not in the village. 
The difference between the two versions is what happens after the participant raids the house. In one version, the 
elder’s information was accurate and there was no insurgent whereas, in the other, the information was inaccurate 
and the insurgent was hiding in the village. In both versions the raid resulted in an injury to a child in the raided 
house.
When the elder’s information was accurate, most participants demonstrated high levels of IPT.  For example one 
Soldier, when asked how he would deal with the village elder after raiding the house said:
“No question about it both parents and elder will be pissed.  An assault on a villager is an assault on the elder.  
Apologize to parents and elder.  Tell Soldier who stuck boy to leave the house and go back to vehicles...I would tell 
the Soldier to get out of house and go back to vehicle.  Apologize to the elder and parents and even kid – sorry 
things got a little rough. We meant you no harm. Try to reestablish positive communication.  One action can 
destabilize the whole foundation of what you’ve built with elder.”  
“(My actions now are) No different than before.  Continue to establish positive communication. Express your 
sorrow. Bring a toy to give to the kid.   Assist in things to help village (irrigation, schools).  If (there is) injury to 
establishment of communication with elder do everything you can to repair it.  Counsel Soldier – what’s wrong, do 
you have any family issues, especially one who has adhered to rules of engagement prior to this.  Maybe he could be 
affected in some negative way.  If injury to the child was visible to whole village and the village gets their arms and 
attack soldiers.  Most likely will be the Elder will tell you to get out.  Elder is a central piece, all decisions revolve 
around him”
This participant demonstrated a high level of IPT by understanding how raiding the house and injuring a child 
could significantly damage his relationship with both the village elder and the village.  Additionally, he described 
how he would attempt to repair these relationships, as well as how he would check on the mental state of the Soldier 
who harmed the child.  This Soldier’s response was typical of the majority of participant responses in the condition 
in which the village elder was seen as telling the truth (i.e., the insurgent was not in the house).  
However, when the information was inaccurate, performance varied wildly and participants often refused to 
consider the elder’s perspective.   For example, one Soldier stated:
“It was a good escalation of force – no loss of life.  Difficult is we didn’t find the weapon and the person who 
fired at us, and also that the elder didn’t give us permission, but we found Antoine [the insurgent]. So now we have 
to reevaluate our relationship with the elder, so I’m not as worried about repairing our relationship with him as I 
am sure the elder is not in control in of the village or he’s a flat-out liar and I can’t trust him as well.  I think it 
would be easy to calm down that the boy got hit – no loss of life.
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Now I’m not sure I can trust this elder – either he’s incompetent or he’s a flat-out liar and what else has he not 
told me or deceived me about?  Can I trust him in the future?  Is there someone who can replace the elder if need 
be?”
This response was typical for participant responses in the condition in which the village elder was seen as not 
telling the truth (i.e., the insurgent was in the house).  Some Soldiers were able to suggest alternative explanations. 
For example, some suggested that perhaps the village elder did not know the insurgent was in the house, perhaps the 
village elder was scared of retribution from insurgent forces if the insurgent was found, or perhaps the village elder
viewed the raid as a threat to his authority. However, many Soldiers stated that because the Elder had lied to them,
they would not trust him in the future.  
The effects of this scenario often also carried over to the rest of the simulation interview.  For example, in section 
six participants must determine why locals have failed to show up for security forces training as promised.  In the 
condition in which the village elder was seen as trustworthy (i.e., the insurgent was not in the house) participants 
tended to engage in IPT by considering alternative explanations for why the locals did not show up. For example,
some Soldiers suggested that perhaps the locals did not have reliable transportation, perhaps the locals were scared 
they would be targeted by insurgents for working with American forces, or perhaps the locals had a different social 
norm for meeting times.  Participants in this condition also identified ways to address these problems (e.g., finding 
transportation, improving security). In contrast, in the condition in which the village elder was seen as not 
trustworthy (i.e., the insurgent was in the house), participants tended to default to a single explanation (e.g., the 
locals are lazy). 
The simulation interview approach showed promise for examining how a specific 3C KSAA can be impacted by 
situational factors.  In this case, participants who felt the village elder had misled them appeared to demonstrate less 
IPT than participants who felt the village elder had told the truth.  Thus, the situational factor Drivers of Effective 
Partnership (e.g., a Soldier lacked trust in the individual with whom he or she was interacting) may significantly 
impact IPT and mission effectiveness.
4. Assessment and training implications
4.1. Assessment 
A key challenge facing 3C researchers is being able to predict an individual’s ability to be mission effective in 
novel cross-cultural operating environments [12].  As situational factors may significantly impact a person’s ability 
to demonstrate a particular KSAA, the predictive ability of assessment tools that do not account for situational 
factors will suffer.  For example, a situational judgement test designed around the scenario in which the village elder
was perceived as telling the truth to assess a person’s IPT might inflate the respondents’ scores. However, the results
would not be indicative of how those respondents would behave in a situation in which they do not trust the person 
with whom they are interacting.  Thus, to assess a specific 3C KSAA, it would be invaluable to be able to map how 
a range of situations impact the ability of a person to demonstrate that 3C KSAA (e.g., very difficult to demonstrate
IPT when there is a perceived threat to personal safety, easy to demonstrate IPT when a person is interacting with 
someone they trust). Then, assessment tools can leverage these maps to provide a more useful assessment of 3C as it 
relates to cross-cultural effectiveness.
4.2. Training
In order to design effective 3C training, it is vital to understand what makes situations difficult and use this 
knowledge to drive the development of effective training scenarios. For example, incorporating situational factors 
would allow trainers to start trainees in a relatively easy scenario and then gradually increase the difficulty level by
adding situational factors known to hinder a particular 3C KSAA.  It may also be beneficial to train Warfighters how 
certain situational factors can hinder/facilitate 3C KSAAs that are vital for mission success.  For instance, if a person 
can recognize difficult situations as they are occurring and understand how that situation may impact his or her 3C,
he or she may be able to take action to mitigate the situation’s impact. 
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5. Summary
Cross-cultural research has primarily focused on what is ‘inside the head’ of the Warfighter, rather than on
situational factors like time pressure and threat to personal safety, in order to predict mission effectiveness in cross-
cultural operational situations.  Interviews with Soldiers with deployment experience in cross-cultural operating 
environments have provided evidence that situational variables can substantially impact the levels of 3C KSAAs 
displayed by a Soldier. The design of relevant and effective assessment and training tools requires effort beyond 
attempting to understand what is ‘inside the head’ of a cross-culturally competent Warfighter to better understand 
situational factors that promote or hinder 3C KSAAs (e.g., IPT). Future research must leverage this understanding of 
the situational factors that impact Warfighter 3C to drive the development of relevant and effective assessment and 
training tools.
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